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The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of
Qualified Immunity
Kit Kinports

†

The qualified immunity defense available to most executive
branch officials in § 1983 cases is a creature of policy constructed by the Supreme Court for the express purpose of “shield[ing]
[government actors] from undue interference with their duties
1
and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” In contrast
to the absolute immunity accorded to legislators, judges, and
prosecutors, the Court no longer engages in any pretense that
its qualified immunity rulings are interpreting the congres2
sional intent underlying § 1983.
In its 1982 decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme
Court openly refashioned the definition of qualified immunity
in the interest of sparing public officials not only from liability,
but also from the costs of litigation, “permit[ting] the resolution
3
of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.” Harlow
eliminated the subjective prong of the Court’s prior two-part
definition of qualified immunity and rewrote the objective
prong to provide that executive-branch officials are safeguarded
from liability so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea4
sonable person would have known.” In the years since Harlow,
† Professor and Polisher Family Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Penn
State Law. Copyright © 2016 by Kit Kinports.
1. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
2. Compare Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978) (reasoning,
despite § 1983’s unqualified language, that Congress must have intended to
incorporate common law immunities for judges), with Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (acknowledging that the Court has “completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the
common law”).
3. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685
(2009) (“The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials
from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’”
(quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment))).
4. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (overruling Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
322 (1975), which denied qualified immunity to government officials either if
they “knew or reasonably should have known that the[ir] action . . . would vio-
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the Court has continued to refine the defense and expand the
5
protection it affords government officials.
At the same time, the breadth of the defense has become
apparent in the Supreme Court decisions applying the Harlow
standard. During the past fifteen years, the Court has issued
eighteen opinions addressing the question whether a particular
constitutional right was clearly established. In sixteen of those
eighteen cases, the Court found the governmental defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that,
whether or not they acted in contravention of the Constitution,
6
they did not violate clearly established law. The Court has not
ruled in favor of a § 1983 plaintiff on this question in more than
7
a decade.
Interestingly, more than one-third of these sixteen defendant-friendly rulings came in summary reversals, including at
least one in each of the past four years. These cases represent
about one of every seven opinions the Court issued without
8
briefing and oral argument during that four-year period. Given
late” the Constitution, or if they acted “with the malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury”).
5. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (justifying the decision to retreat from the requirement that courts ruling on qualified immunity
motions first address the threshold issue whether the plaintiff alleged a constitutional violation, in part on the grounds that the “two-step protocol ‘disserve[d] the purpose of qualified immunity’” by “forc[ing] the parties to endure
additional burdens of suit . . . when the suit otherwise could be disposed of
more readily” (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30, Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009) (No. 07-751), 2008 WL 3831556)); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 639–41 (1987) (adopting a “particularized,” “fact-specific” approach to qualified immunity because a standard applied at a high “level of
generality” would enable plaintiffs “to convert the rule of qualified immunity
. . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of
extremely abstract rights”).
6. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015) (per curiam); Taylor
v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (per curiam); City and Cty. of S.F. v.
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 352
(2014) (per curiam); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2383 (2014); Wood v.
Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2068–69 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012,
2024 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2013) (per curiam); Reichle v.
Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2096–97 (2012); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S.
Ct. 1235, 1250 (2012); Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 992 (2012) (per curiam);
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1
v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378–79 (2009); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 243–44;
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam); Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 209 (2001).
7. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 (2004); see also Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 745–46 (2002).
8. See KEDAR S. BHATIA, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2014, at 15
(2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/final-stat-pack-for-october-term
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that the only question discussed in these per curiam opinions
was how Harlow’s clearly established law standard applied to a
particular set of facts, these decisions arguably reflect the
Court’s willingness to overcome its usual reluctance to assume
an error-correcting role in a fact-bound case in the interest of
9
protecting government officials from § 1983 litigation. Ironically, Justices Alito and Scalia leveled an objection along those
lines in the one summary reversal that favored a § 1983 plaintiffwhich did not even go so far as to find that the defendant
violated clearly established law, but merely that the lower
court ignored “evidence that contradicted some of its key factual conclusions” and thereby failed to view the record on sum10
mary judgment in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
But my purpose here is not to criticize the Court for its selective use of summary reversals or for decisions like Harlow
that transparently alter precedent. Instead, my focus is on the
Supreme Court’s qualified immunity opinions that have made a
sub silentio assault on constitutional tort suits. In a number of
recent rulings, the Court has engaged in a pattern of covertly
broadening the defense, describing it in increasingly generous
terms and inexplicably adding qualifiers to precedent that then
take on a life of their own. This pattern began in 2011 with
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd and continued with last Term’s decisions in
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan and Heien v.
North Carolina. In making this claim, I explore three different
issues: (1) how the Court characterizes the standard governing
the qualified immunity defense; (2) whether lower court opin-2014/.
9. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (admonishing that “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual
findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law”); cf. Scott
Michelman, Taylor v. Barkes: Summary Reversal Is Part of a Qualified Immunity Trend, SCOTUSBLOG (June 2, 2015, 11:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2015/06/taylor-v-barkes-summary-reversal-is-part-of-a-qualified
-immunity-trend/ (suggesting as an alternative “horse-trading” explanation
that these summary reversals represent “a kind of compromise position” that
“satisfies Justices who want to protect the government officials before them
and mollifies others who might fear a broader ruling that could harm civil
rights plaintiffs across a range of cases”).
10. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam); see id. at
1868–69 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (complaining that “[t]here is no
confusion in the courts of appeals about the standard to be applied in ruling on
a summary judgment motion” and therefore “the granting of review in this
case sets a precedent that, if followed in other cases, will very substantially
alter the Court’s practice”). But cf. Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 991 (reasoning, in
summarily reversing denial of qualified immunity, that the court of appeals’
decision “rested on an account of the facts that differed markedly from the
District Court’s finding”).
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ions can create clearly established law; and (3) how qualified
immunity compares to Fourth Amendment principles. As detailed below, in each of these areas the Court haswithout offering any explanation, and without even acknowledging it is
doing sobroadened the protection qualified immunity offers
government officials in § 1983 litigation.
I. DEFINING THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY STANDARD
The Harlow formulation of the qualified immunity defense
set out above focused on what “a reasonable person” would
have known about the constitutional status of the right asserted by the plaintiff. The Court has adhered to that description of
the standard in a long line of cases, noting in Anderson v.
Creighton, for example, that the relevant question is whether
the law is “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
11
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
In 2011, in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion quoted this portion of Anderson v. Creighton in introducing the Court’s discussion of qualified immunity and laying
out the rules governing the defense. But Justice Scalia’s quotation broke up the Anderson language, asserting that qualified
immunity protects government officials unless the law is “‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have under12
stood that what he is doing violates that right.’” The Court did
not explain, or even acknowledge, the substitution of “every” for
13
“a,” but later opinions have picked up on al-Kidd’s modifica14
tion of Anderson.
11. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also, e.g., Moss,
134 S. Ct. at 2067; Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1244; Pearson, 555 U.S. at
231; Groh, 540 U.S. at 563; Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202,
208.
12. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (emphasis added)
(quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). But cf. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
350 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing, in
arguing in favor of granting qualified immunity, that “[u]nder the Harlow
standard, we need not consider whether this information would be viewed by
every reasonable officer as sufficient evidence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant”).
13. See Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L.
REV. 633, 656 (2013) (hypothesizing that this alteration may have gone unchallenged because “Justice Scalia did not call attention to the shift and the
other Justices simply did not notice the change in the law”).
14. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam); Taylor
v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam); Reichle v. Howards, 132
S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012); cf. id. at 2095–96 (also using “a” reasonable official
standard).
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In the following sentence in al-Kidd, the majority went on
to say, “[w]e do not require a case directly on point, but existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
15
question beyond debate.” The phrase “beyond debate,” which
appeared for the first time in al-Kidd, has been used in eight of
the eleven subsequent Supreme Court opinions that have concluded government officials did not act in violation of clearly es16
tablished law. In support of this sentence, Justice Scalia cited
Malley v. Briggs (presumably the Court’s observation there
that, “[a]s the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or
17
those who knowingly violate the law”) and Anderson v.
Creighton (presumably language in that opinion requiring that
“in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the gov18
ernment official’s conduct] must be apparent”).
Malley’s reference to “plain[] incompeten[ce]” and “knowing[] violat[ions]” has been an increasingly popular refrain in
the Supreme Court opinions concluding that government actors
19
did not violate clearly established law. But this language initially appeared as dictum in Malleywithout supporting citationin a discussion explaining why police officers who execute
a warrant not predicated on probable cause are afforded adequate protection by the qualified immunity defense “[a]s [it]
has evolved,” and therefore are not entitled to absolute immunity. Thus, the Malley language, while colorful, did not appear in
a context suggesting any intent to effect a substantive change
in the qualified immunity standard.
Similarly, the Court’s focus in Anderson was specifically
directed at “the level of generality at which the relevant ‘legal
rule’ is to be identified” and not the strength of the evidence

15. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.
16. See Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308, 309, 311, 312; Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at
2044; City and Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015); Carroll v.
Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350, 352 (2014) (per curiam); Lane v. Franks, 134 S.
Ct. 2369, 2383 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5, 7 (2013) (per curiam); Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093.
17. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.
18. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
19. See Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308, 310; Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044;
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774; Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 350; Stanton, 134 S. Ct. at
5–7; Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244, 1249–50 (2012); alKidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085; Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 571 (2004) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 752, 758 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 229 (1991).
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20

needed to defeat a claim of qualified immunity. Moreover, although the Anderson Court cited three cases in support of the
notion that “unlawfulness must be apparent,” none of
themsave perhaps for Malleysuggested any deviation from
21
Harlow’s objective reasonableness standard.
Finally, other parts of the opinions in both Malley and Anderson described the qualified immunity standard in the more
prosaic tones used in Harlow, with the Malley Court noting, for
example, that the relevant inquiry is “whether a reasonably
well-trained officer in petitioner’s position would have known
that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he
22
should not have applied for the warrant.” Harlow itself likewise identified the government actors qualified immunity was
intended to protect in narrower and more neutral terms: those
who “could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent
legal developments, nor . . . to ‘know’ that the law forbade con23
duct not previously identified as unlawfu1.”
The Court’s tendency in recent cases to use a different tenor in describing the qualified immunity standardwithout explanation or acknowledgementmay seem to be just a subtle
shift in tone, but it signals a potentially significant alteration
in the Justices’ views of the relative weight owed to the interests of plaintiffs and defendants in § 1983 litigation. In
Mullenix v. Luna, the most recent decision in this line of cases,
the Court’s entire description of the controlling standard reads
as follows:
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials
from civil liability so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” A clearly established right is one that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.”
“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing
20. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
21. See id. at 640 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 344–45; Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191, 195 (1984)).
22. Malley, 475 U.S. at 345. For comparable language in Anderson, see
supra text accompanying note 11.
23. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Saucier, 533
U.S. at 206 (noting that qualified immunity “operates . . . to protect officers
from the sometimes ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,’ and
to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their
conduct is unlawful” (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926–27
(11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted))).
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precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” “Put simply, qualified
immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or
24
those who knowingly violate the law.”
Noticeably absent from this summary of the law—which
borrowed extensively from the modifications described above—
is any reference to the countervailing interests in vindicating
constitutional rights and compensating victims of constitutional injury. The need to balance these competing goals in fashioning the qualified immunity defense was recognized in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, and at least received lip service in later Supreme
25
Court opinions that ultimately sided with the defendant. Even
if just a shift in tone, these generous characterizations of the
qualified immunity defense can act to place a thumb on the
scales favoring public officials in constitutional tort litigation
and to justify dismissing an even greater majority of § 1983
26
suits on qualified immunity grounds.
Perhaps of even greater practical import, however, is the
Court’s recent suggestion that clearly established law can only
be created by Supreme Court opinions. The Court’s quiet retreat from precedent on that issue is the subject of the following
section.

24. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting, in order, Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012); alKidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083; Malley, 475 U.S. at 341).
25. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–14; see also Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct.
2056, 2067 (2014); Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. But cf.
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774 n.3 (“Because of the importance of qualified immunity ‘to society as a whole,’ the Court often corrects lower courts when they
wrongly subject individual officers to liability.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814)).
26. See Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An
Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 692 (2009) (finding, in a random
sample of qualified immunity opinions issued by federal courts between 1988
and 2006, that immunity was denied in only about twenty to thirty percent of
the cases); Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of
Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 545 (2010) (reporting that qualified immunity
was denied in about one-third of a random sample of nine hundred § 1983 cases decided by the federal appellate courts between 1976 and 2006). See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L.
REV. 207, 269 (2013) (concluding that “[t]he barriers raised by qualified immunity, as currently administered, far exceed the rationales that support limiting damages liability” and are “an inversion of sensible policy”).
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II. DETERMINING WHICH COURTS CAN CREATE
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW
The Harlow Court did not attempt to apply its newly formulated qualified immunity standard to the facts of that case,
and expressly left open the question whether rights can be
27
“clearly established” by lower court case law. In denying qualified immunity to Alabama state prison officials in Hope v.
Pelzer, however, the Court cited “binding Eleventh Circuit
precedent” as well as a State Department of Corrections regulation and a United States Department of Justice Report to
support the conclusion that the officials acted in violation of
28
clearly established law. Two years ago, in Lane v. Franks, the
Court likewise observed that, had two earlier Eleventh Circuit
precedents still been “controlling” in that jurisdiction, the
Court “would agree [the defendant] . . . could not reasonably
have believed that it was lawful to fire [the plaintiff] in retalia29
tion for his testimony.” Given a later circuit court opinion,
however, the Supreme Court explained that, “[a]t best,” the
plaintiff could “demonstrate only a discrepancy in Eleventh
Circuit precedent, which is insufficient to defeat the defense of
30
qualified immunity.” Moreover, in other cases concluding that
government officials are entitled to qualified immunity, the
Court has relied on binding state and federal precedent, finding
it significant both that the defendants’ conduct was “lawful ac31
cording to courts in the jurisdiction where [they] acted” and
27. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.32.
28. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741–42 (2002); cf. Camreta v. Greene,
131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) (cautioning that “the considerations” leading
the Court to grant a cert petition filed by government officials who were afforded qualified immunity and thus were the prevailing parties in the court of
appeals might not “have the same force” for district court opinions because
“district court decisions—unlike those from the courts of appeals—do not necessarily settle constitutional standards or prevent repeated claims of qualified
immunity”); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997) (refusing, in a
case involving the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal counterpart to § 1983,
to adopt “a categorical rule that decisions of the Courts of Appeals and other
courts are inadequate as a matter of law” to provide fair warning to public officials).
29. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2382 (2014).
30. Id. at 2383.
31. Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2013) (per curiam); see also City and
Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015) (concluding that “[n]o
matter how carefully” the defendants “read [the relevant circuit court precedents] beforehand,” they “could not know” they were “violat[ing] the Ninth
Circuit’s test”); Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2382 (finding it significant that circuit
“precedent did not provide clear notice” that the defendant was acting unconstitutionally).
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that the plaintiffs were unable to identify “any cases of control32
ling authority in their jurisdiction.” Thus, the Court has repeatedly looked beyond its own case law in assessing whether a
constitutional right is clearly established.
Beginning with Justice Thomas’ 2012 majority opinion in
Reichle v. Howards, however, the Court began to equivocate on
this issue, introducing its discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s prior
case law with a caveat, “[a]ssuming arguendo that controlling
Court of Appeals’ authority could be a dispositive source of
33
clearly established law in the circumstances of this case.” The
Court did not identify what “circumstances” in Reichle might
have justified this reservation, nor did it provide any other explanation for the statement and its deviation from past prac34
tice. But the Court has gone on to repeat the caveat on several
35
occasions, most recently adding a potentially limiting qualifier—“[a]ssuming for the sake of argument that a right can be
‘clearly established’ by circuit precedent despite disagreement
36
in the courts of appeals.”
The Court has also started to back pedal from earlier precedent suggesting that “a consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from lower courts outside the defendants’ jurisdiction
37
can create clearly established law. Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in al-Kidd described “a robust ‘consensus of cases of
persuasive authority’” as “what is necessary” to support a deni-

32. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
33. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2094 (2012).
34. See Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and
the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 955 n.283 (2015) (suggesting
that the Court’s “tentativeness . . . made some sense in Reichle, where the defendants were federal law enforcement agents who operate nationally,” but
was “not so justified” in other cases).
35. See Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (per curiam);
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776; Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per
curiam).
36. Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2045 (emphasis added). This Term’s decision in
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 310–12 (2015) (per curiam), mentioned at
several points that none of the Court’s precedents supported a denial of qualified immunity, but then went on to discuss lower court case law from both the
court below and other circuits.
37. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617; cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244
(2009) (reasoning, in granting qualified immunity, that defendant police officers were “entitled to rely” on decisions from other courts “even though their
own Federal Circuit had not yet ruled” on the issue). For other cases relying
on a split in the courts of appeals to support granting qualified immunity, see,
e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2383 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct.
3, 5–7 (2013) (per curiam); Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2096–97; Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378 (2009).
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38

al of qualified immunity “absent controlling authority.” Despite al-Kidd’s addition of the qualifier “robust,” the Court as of
2011 therefore seemed to acknowledge that Supreme Court
precedent is not required to clearly establish a constitutional
right.
The retreat from al-Kidd on this front began three years
later. In Plumhoff v. Rickard, Justice Alito’s majority opinion
gratuitously recharacterized al-Kidd’s statement as a descrip39
tion of what a § 1983 plaintiff “at a minimum” must show.
Writing again for the Court last Term in City and County of
San Francisco v. Sheehan, Justice Alito quoted al-Kidd’s “robust consensus” language, but did so in a way that suggested—
contrary to al-Kidd—that whether such a consensus suffices to
overcome a claim of qualified immunity is an open question.
Joined by the five other Justices who took a position on qualified immunity, Justice Alito’s opinion in Sheehan branded qualified immunity an “exacting standard” and then said: “[f]inally,
to the extent that a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ could itself clearly establish the federal right respond40
ent alleges, no such consensus exists here.” The Court went on
to repeat Sheehan’s equivocal “consensus” statement in its per
41
curiam ruling in Taylor v. Barkes. In none of these three opinions did the Court offer a rationale for its caveats or even recognize that it was departing from precedent.
As a matter of substance, the Court’s recent hints that
§ 1983 plaintiffs may need controlling Supreme Court precedent to defeat a claim of qualified immunity are troubling because the Court is much less likely to grant review in the ab42
sence of a conflict among the lower courts. As the majority
pointed out in Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding,
“[t]he unconstitutionality of outrageous conduct obviously will
be unconstitutional, this being the reason, as Judge Posner has

38. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (quoting Wilson, 526
U.S. at 617).
39. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014).
40. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774, 1778 (citation omitted) (quoting al-Kidd,
131 S. Ct. at 2084).
41. See Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044.
42. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (noting that the Court grants cert “only for compelling reasons” and listing conflicts in the lower courts among “the character of
the reasons the Court considers”); see also David R. Stras, The Supreme
Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 947, 981–82 (2007) (book review) (reporting that almost seventy percent of the Court’s merits docket during the 2003–2005 Terms was devoted to
conflict cases).
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43

said, that ‘[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise.’” As a matter of
process, the Court’s retreat on this issue is subject to criticism
as another example of its tendency to qualify and depart from
its precedents without explanation or acknowledgement, and
thereby to covertly extend the reach of the qualified immunity
defense.
III. COMPARING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
A final illustration of the Court’s pattern of silently expanding the qualified immunity defense can be found in last
Term’s brief description in Heien v. North Carolina of the relationship between qualified immunity and Fourth Amendment
standards. Although Heien is a criminal case and not a § 1983
suit, the Justices’ opinions describe qualified immunity in very
generous terms reminiscent of the qualified immunity decisions
analyzed above in Part I.
In prior cases that have addressed the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity, the
Court has long equated the qualified immunity inquiry with
the analysis used in applying the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule recognized in United States v. Leon and its
44
progeny. Since its 1986 ruling in Malley v. Briggs, the Court
has taken the position that “the same standard of objective reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression
hearing in Leon . . . defines the qualified immunity accorded an
officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an uncon45
stitutional arrest.” Adopting different standards of reasonableness in these two contexts “would be incongruous,” the
Malley Court explained, given that the exclusionary rule imposes “a considerable cost to society” by suppressing relevant
evidence, whereas a § 1983 suit “imposes a cost directly on the
officer responsible . . . without the side effect of hampering a
43. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009)
(quoting K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990)).
44. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984) (refusing to apply
the exclusionary rule where police reasonably rely on a defective warrant); see
also Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424, 2429 (2011) (applying goodfaith exception where police reasonably rely on “binding appellate precedent”
that is later overturned); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (extending good-faith exception to police reliance on court clerk’s out-of-date computer
records); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987) (applying good-faith exception where police reasonably rely on an unconstitutional statute authorizing warrantless searches).
45. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986).
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criminal prosecution,” and is therefore more likely to aid indi46
viduals “who in fact ha[ve] done no wrong.” The Court has reiterated the analogy on several occasions, most recently in 2012
47
in Messerschmidt v. Millender.
In Heien v. North Carolina, the Court concluded that the
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop may be based
48
on a police officer’s reasonable mistake of law. In response to
the concern that the Court’s holding would create an incentive
for police to remain ignorant about the law, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the majority remarked that “[t]he Fourth
Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively reasona49
ble.” On its face, this standard of objective reasonableness
seems to resemble Harlow’s definition of qualified immunity,
but the Chief Justice went on to add that the Fourth Amendment “inquiry is not as forgiving” as the one used in “the distinct context” of qualified immunity and “[t]hus, an officer can
gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study
50
of the laws.”
Although the Court’s warning may seem in tension with
Malley’s description of the relationship between the Fourth
Amendment and qualified immunity, the majority opinion in
Heien distinguished both its qualified immunity precedents and
the good-faith exception cases on the ground that in those contexts the Court “had already found or assumed a Fourth
Amendment violation” and was “considering the appropriate
51
remedy.” By contrast, Heien involved “the antecedent question” whether “there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment

46. Id. But cf. Krull, 480 U.S. at 368 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning the comparison between the good-faith exception and qualified immunity
because “suppression of illegally obtained evidence does not implicate [Harlow’s] concern” that “individual government officers ought not be subjected to
damages suits for arguable constitutional violations”); Orin S. Kerr, Good
Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077,
1110 (2011) (arguing that the two contexts are “conceptually different” because qualified immunity focuses on the reasonableness of “one institutional
player” whereas the good-faith exception focuses on the police “considered as a
collective entity”).
47. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 n.1 (2012);
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004); id. at 566 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).
49. Id. at 539.
50. Id. at 539–40.
51. Id. at 539.
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52

in the first place.” Even accepting the Court’s distinction between constitutional rights and remedies, the substantive
Fourth Amendment question at issue in Heien—whether a police officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop
Heien’s car—did not turn on the officer’s understanding of
Fourth Amendment principles. Rather, the mistake of law
there involved a matter of state criminal law: whether North
Carolina required vehicles to have two functioning brake lights.
In fact, all nine Justices seemed to agree in Heien that a mistake about Fourth Amendment doctrine would have been irrel53
evant in that case “no matter how reasonable.” But if the government actor’s understanding of federal constitutional
principles, which forms the core of the inquiry in cases involving qualified immunity and the good-faith exception, was inconsequential in Heien, it is not apparent that the Heien dictum has much to say about the scope of the qualified immunity
defense.
In any event, the Heien majority offered no justification for
its suggestion that different standards of objective reasonableness govern the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity,
and did not explain in what ways qualified immunity is more
“forgiving.” But Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
wrote a concurring opinion that expanded on this point. Quoting Malley’s reference to plain incompetence and knowing violations, the two concurring Justices agreed with the majority
that the Fourth Amendment’s definition of a reasonable mistake is “more demanding” than the qualified immunity inquiry
and then went on to elaborate that the former requires a law
that is “genuinely ambiguous,” “‘so doubtful in construction’
54
that a reasonable judge could agree with the officer’s view.” In

52. Id. The Court was presumably referring here to the part of the qualified immunity inquiry that evaluates whether the constitutional right was
clearly established and not the question whether the plaintiff suffered any
constitutional injury. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009)
(recognizing that the qualified immunity standard encompasses both prongs,
but declining to mandate which step courts analyze first).
53. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (“An officer’s mistaken view that the conduct
at issue did not give rise to [a Fourth Amendment] violation—no matter how
reasonable—could not change that ultimate conclusion.”); see also id. at 541
n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that “an error about
the contours of the Fourth Amendment itself . . . can never support a search or
seizure”); id. at 546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (likewise noting the Court’s
“prior assumption” that police have no “leeway” when making mistakes about
the Fourth Amendment).
54. Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting The Friendship, 9 F. Cas.
825, 826 (No. 5,125) (C.C. Mass. 1812)).
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support of this assertion, Justice Kagan cited the Solicitor General’s observation at oral argument that the two standards “‘require essentially the opposite’ showings” as well as “a similar
55
point” made in the State of North Carolina’s brief.
Starting with the brief filed on behalf of the State, the pages pinpointed by Justice Kagan observed that “what is objectively reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes is not the
same as what is objectively reasonable for qualified immunity
56
purposes.” In support, the State cited the Court’s qualified
immunity precedents in excessive force cases, which have rejected the argument that qualified immunity and the merits of
a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim are “‘merely duplicative’ . . . because both issues ‘concern the objective reasona57
bleness of the officer’s conduct.’” Rather, the Court held in
Saucier v. Katz, law enforcement officials are entitled to qualified immunity if they make a reasonable mistake “as to whether a particular amount of force is legal” in the circumstances
58
confronting them, explaining further in Brosseau v. Haugen
that the law governing the permissible use of force is “one in
59
which the result depends very much on the facts of each case.”
The Court made a similar point in discussing the Fourth
Amendment concept of probable cause in Anderson v.
Creighton, concluding that qualified immunity protects police
officers who “reasonably but mistakenly” believe they have the
60
probable cause needed to search or arrest. Although the reasoning in these cases can be criticized for “[d]ouble counting ‘ob61
jective reasonableness,’” if they represent the Justices’ views
of the difference between Fourth Amendment standards and
qualified immunity, Heien’s impact is limited to a subset of §
1983 cases and the opinion breaks no new ground.
Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Heien also cited, however,
the Solicitor General’s statements at oral argument, which

55. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604), 2014 WL 7661632).
56. Brief for the Respondent at 31, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct.
530 (2014) (No. 13-604), 2014 WL 3660500.
57. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 203 (2001)).
58. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.
59. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam); see also
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (noting that it can be
“‘difficult for an officer to determine’” how the standards governing excessive
force “‘apply to the factual situation the officer confronts’” (quoting Saucier,
533 U.S. at 205)).
60. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
61. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
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made a different point. In describing how qualified immunity
and the Fourth Amendment are “opposite,” the Solicitor General, quoting Malley’s familiar refrain, maintained that the
Fourth Amendment would not deem an officer’s mistake of law
reasonable absent some “affirmative[] support[]” for the error
“in the statute,” whereas law enforcement officials are entitled
to qualified immunity unless “a precedent . . . forecloses” their
62
actions. This proposition is potentially more troubling and
may open the door to a more general expansion of the qualified
immunity defense. If the Solicitor General was merely pointing
out that the reasonable belief inquiry in cases like Heien focuses on officers’ understanding of state criminal statutes, as opposed to their understanding of federal constitutional case law,
that is undeniably correct. But that unremarkable observation
does not justify the Justices’ view that, in evaluating the reasonableness of an officer’s beliefs, one standard is more “forgiving” or “demanding” than the other.
Alternatively, then, the Solicitor General may have been
implying that the tie goes to the police officer in qualified immunity cases but not in Fourth Amendment cases like Heien—
which is consistent with Justice Kagan’s observation that the
ruling in Heien would deem police officers’ erroneous understanding of state law to be reasonable only in “exceedingly rare” cases involving a “genuinely ambiguous” statute, whereas
their mistakes about federal constitutional law are considered
reasonable for qualified immunity purposes except in the presumably unusual circumstances of plain incompetence or know63
ing violations of Fourth Amendment norms. But it is not obvious why law enforcement officials should enjoy a presumption
in some contexts but not others. After all, the Court has never
decided which party in a § 1983 suit shoulders the burden of
64
proof on qualified immunity, and in fact described the defense
in Elder v. Holloway as raising “a question of law, not one of
65
‘legal facts.’” And if the argument is that the Court has explic62. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 51.
63. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 541 (2014) (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for the Respondent, supra note 56, at 17; Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 48).
64. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 n.24 (1982) (expressly
leaving this question open).
65. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). Although Elder arguably
should have “finally put to rest” descriptions of qualified immunity in language “implicating evidentiary and related burden of proof considerations,” 2
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE
LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 8.96, at 8-614 (4th ed. 2015), lower courts continue to
talk in terms of burden of proof, generally requiring plaintiffs to establish that
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itly applied a balancing test in defining the qualified immunity
66
defense and good-faith exception, some Supreme Court opinions have also described substantive Fourth Amendment analysis in balancing-test terms—in fact, on the express grounds
that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonable67
ness.” Accordingly, the Court has provided no justification for
using varying standards to measure the “objective reasonable68
ness” of a police officer’s beliefs.
Given the Court’s distinction between Fourth Amendment
rights and remedies, Heien may not signal a retreat from the
precedents analogizing qualified immunity and the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. Nevertheless, the Justices’
amorphous suggestion that qualified immunity is a “forgiving”
rather than “demanding” standard—and the implication that
public officials who make “sloppy” errors may nevertheless satisfy qualified immunity’s objective reasonableness inquiry—
mirror the change in the tone used to characterize the qualified
immunity defense that is discussed in Part I. Justice
Sotomayor, dissenting in Heien, criticized the majority’s insistence on leaving “undefined” the objective reasonableness
standard it was endorsing in that case as well as the failure to
“elaborat[e]” on the distinction between that Fourth Amendment standard and the qualified immunity inquiry, predicting
69
that the difference “will prove murky in application.” Given
the Court’s tendency to qualify its precedents and thereby covertly expand the qualified immunity defense, it would not be at
all surprising to find future § 1983 decisions citing Heien in referring to qualified immunity as a “forgiving” defense and in
dismissing a government actor’s misunderstanding of constitutional doctrine as merely “sloppy” rather than “plainly incomthe constitutional right in question was clearly established. See 2 RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 14:54 (3d ed. 2010).
66. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–07 (1984); Harlow, 457
U.S. at 813–14.
67. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006); see also Maryland
v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
118–19 (2001).
68. Cf. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1999) (“Generally speaking, the kind of fault required [in constitutional tort suits] is negligence with respect to illegality.”).
But cf. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 726 & n.283 (2011) (taking the
contrary view that the Court’s qualified immunity cases “approach[] a standard sounding more in gross negligence or recklessness”).
69. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 547 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
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petent.”
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the Supreme Court opinions applying the
qualified immunity defense have engaged in a pattern of describing the defense in increasingly generous terms and qualifying and deviating from past precedent—without offering any
justification or even acknowledgement of the Court’s departure
from prior case law. These gratuitous, seemingly off-the-cuff
remarks have then taken on a life of their own and have been
reiterated in later opinions, often issued summarily without the
benefit of briefing and oral argument. The clandestine manner
in which this retreat has been accomplished is especially troubling because, despite the fact that constitutional tort suits
against state officials are based on federal statute, qualified
immunity is a doctrine—and a limitation on that statute—that
is entirely the Court’s creation, devoid of support in § 1983’s
legislative history.
Perhaps most problematic are the caveats in recent decisions that could conceivably set the stage for a ruling that
§ 1983 plaintiffs can avoid qualified immunity only if they can
point to Supreme Court precedent supporting the constitutional
right they are asserting. An outright holding that only the Supreme Court can create clearly established law would obviously
be binding on lower courts and would prove fatal to many constitutional tort suits. But terminology and tone matter as well,
and the increasingly broad brush the Supreme Court uses in
characterizing the qualified immunity defense is not likely to
escape the attention of government actors seeking immunity or
the lower courts tasked with resolving their claims.

